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Davide Vampa 
Matteo Salvini’s Northern League in 2016: between stasis and new opportunities  
2016 may be regarded as a year of transition for the Northern League. After reaching one of 
the lowest points in its history in 2012 and 2013, under Matteo Salvini’s leadership the League 
has since then experienced a period of recovery and significant electoral successes. In 2015 
many commentators expected that the Northern League would replace Forza Italia (FI), Silvio 
Berlusconi’s party, as the largest party of the centre-right and Salvini would be the candidate 
to challenge Matteo Renzi as Prime Minister. Yet the 2016 local elections seem to mark a 
slowdown in the political expansion of the party. Salvini’s popularity did not grow further 
and even started to decline. At the same time, the success of Donald Trump in the US, the 
outcome of the constitutional referendum in December 2016 (see chapter X by Martin Bull), 
and Matteo Renzi’s eventual defeat and resignation as Prime Minister, may open new 
opportunities for the party and Salvini’s leadership.  
It is still too early to say whether, as a consequence of the referendum results, the League will 
follow a trajectory of further expansion after a period of stasis. To be sure, the party still needs 
to overcome two important structural constraints, which became evident during the local 
elections. The first one is its difficulty to expand its electoral and organisational reach to the 
regions of southern Italy, thus becoming a fully national(-ised) party.  The second one is the 
new increase in electoral support for the 5 Star Movement (M5S), with which the League 
competes to attract the so-called anti-system or protest vote. More generally, the bloc which 
opposes the governmental camp is very crowded and fragmented and this poses some 
challenges to Salvini’s populist project.  
This chapter starts from an overview of the new political profile of the Northern League under 
Salvini’s leadership. It then moves to a discussion of its electoral campaign and alliance 
strategies in the 2016 local elections. An analysis of electoral results and trends in opinion 
polls from 2013 to 2016 is followed by a section which focuses on the challenges that the 
League had to face after the local elections. The concluding section highlights the new 
opportunities arising from Trump’s victory in the US and Renzi’s defeat in the constitutional 
referendum at the end of the year.   
Changing political identity under Salvini’s leadership 
Since 2014 Matteo Salvini has developed a strategy based on two key objectives: transforming 
the Northern League into a national party, thus downplaying the ideological and 
organisational paradigms of regionalism and federalism; and subverting the political 
hierarchies within the centre-right, by challenging the leading role of a declining Forza Italia.   
The Northern League has undergone a profound process of organisational and ideological 
transformation. At first sight, even after moving from Umberto Bossi to Matteo Salvini , the 
party seems to have remained a fundamentally leadership-based, populist  party [McDonnell 
2015]. However, the party led by Salvini is radically different from the one created by Bossi in 
the 1990s. Ideologically, the themes of federalism, regionalism and eventual independence of 
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central-northern Italy have become less important. This has occurred in a context of economic 
and political crisis, which radically changed key aspects of the Italian political debate. 
In the 1990s and early 2000s devolution and federalism were central issues and political 
competition was significantly shaped by the territorial cleavage dividing the regions of 
northern and southern Italy [Fargion 2005]. Despite receiving between 4 and 10% of the 
national vote, the League managed to have a strong impact on the political agendai. However, 
the post-2010 period saw the emergence of a new scenario characterised by a deep economic 
recession (and austerity), the increasing role played by external actors (in particular, financial 
markets and the European Union), the crisis of the established political system of the so-called 
Seconda Repubblica (Second Republic) and the declining legitimacy of regional institutions, 
increasingly associated with a rather corrupt political class. These changes were also 
accompanied by the rise of a new important political actor, the 5 Star Movement, which 
radically challenged the political establishment (including the Northern League) without 
placing a particular emphasis on territorial issues. 
In a context of multiple political shocks, the populist message of the Northern League became 
less effective and appealing because, after eight years of government (2001-6; 2008-11), it was 
perceived as too embedded (or ‘institutionalised’) within the traditional political system 
[Verbeek and Zaslove 2016, 316-317]. After all, it was the Northern League that made a 
decisive contribution to the end of the First Republic in the 1990s and the emergence of a new 
political equilibrium [Golden 2004]. It was legitimate to assume that when the so-called 
‘Second Republic’ also seemed to come to an end in the mid-2010s, the party’s strong 
identification with this political phase could prove lethal. This, together with the crisis of 
Bossi’s leadership, reinforced the idea that a significant reorientation of the League’s political 
discourse was needed. Matteo Salvini, elected leader at the end of 2013, realised that in order 
to survive, the party needed to reframe the territorial dimension of its populist message. This 
implied a more radical change than the ones promoted by the League leadership in previous 
years – for instance between 2006 and 2008 or 2011 and 2013 – when the party moved from 
government to opposition [Bobba and McDonnell 2016]. Salvini pushed the ‘chameleonic’ 
character of populism [Taggart 2000] to the extreme.  
Rome was no longer regarded as the main enemy and another capital became the main target 
of Northern League rhetoric: Brussels. The territorial cleavage presented by the League was 
no longer about the differences between a wealthy and economically competitive North, and 
a poor and economically dependent South. Instead the territorial cleavage was shifted to the 
European arena. In this new context, Italy as a whole was seen as part of a ‘peripheral’ region 
in a European ‘super-state’ dominated by the ‘core’ countries of central-northern Europe. 
Therefore, the new platform of the party started placing particular emphasis on the opposition 
against the constraints imposed by ‘central’ European institutions and ‘core’ EU member 
states, accused of being responsible for Italian economic decline. This marked the end of a 
political transition. In the early 2000s, the League had already moved from ‘Euro-positivism’ 
(Europe seen as an ally in the political struggle against central governmentsii) to increasing 
Euroscepticism [Chari et al. 2004]. Under Salvini’s leadership, it moved to even more radical 
forms of ‘Euro-rejectionism’ [Kopecký and Mudde 2004].  
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The outright rejection of the process of European integration was (paradoxically) 
accompanied by an intensification of the political relations among right-wing, populist 
leaders across EU member states. The French Front National was increasingly regarded as an 
ally in the fight against Brussels and as the new ideological and organisational model to 
follow. Marine Le Pen was seen by Salvini as ‘an inspiration for his new political project’ 
[Pajnik et al. 2016, 73]. The party has moved even further to the right and established alliances 
with an extreme right, neo-fascist movement, Casa Pound, with which it organised a national 
rally in Rome at the beginning of 2015. In January 2016, Salvini invited Marine Le Pen, Greet 
Wilders (leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom) and the leaders of other far right, Euro-
rejectionist parties (members of the Europe of Nations and Freedom group) to an international 
convention in Milaniii. They launched a cross-national campaign against the Schengen treaty 
and called for tougher policies aimed at reducing immigration and the influx of refugees. 
Already under Bossi’s leadership the party had promoted intense campaigns against 
immigrants, who were regarded as a threat to the identity of Italians, ‘especially Northern 
Italians’ [Zaslove 2004, 105] and risked undermining cultural and social integrity of the 
Padania. With Salvini the same rhetoric was applied to the broader Italian community 
(Diamanti defines this as ‘nationalisation of fears’iv) and linked anti-immigration campaigns 
to the re-establishment of national borders, which have been considerably loosened during 
the process of European integration. 
This ideological shift also meant that the regionally concentrated organisation of the party had 
to change. On the one hand, Salvini abandoned the traditional idea of the mass party, 
characterised by heavy organisation. Falling membership and the sharp decline in public 
subsidies [McDonnell and Vampa, 2016] has forced the leadership to rely on new social media 
and constant presence in TV talks as part of a cheaper, but equally effective, campaign 
strategy. At the same time, the Northern League could advance its mission as an anti-EU 
party, fighting for Italian emancipation from the process of European integration, by 
becoming a truly national party. This required an intensive campaign in the southern Italian 
regions, allowing the territorial expansion of the League. As highlighted by Vercesi [2016, 
400], 
Salvini opened the door to the possible activation of a broader constituency on 
specific issues, particularly European monetary policy. The expansion strategy 
was closely accompanied by the creation of a parallel political list – that lacked 
any graphic references to the classic League – to be presented in the central-
southern regions called Noi con Salvini (Us with Salvini)  
In late 2014 numerous groups of Salvini’s supporters emerged in southern Italy and created 
Noi Con Salvini committees, suggesting that the process of ‘nationalisation’ of the party 
structure and political strategy was well under way. Additionally, the name and platform of 
the new ‘sister party’ highlighted the centrality of the leader in the process of territorial 
expansion and ideological transformation. In northern Italy, Salvini still had to accommodate 
the demands coming from well-established regional leaders, such as Roberto Maroni and 
Luca Zaia, who could rely on their personal support and power positions as the Presidents of 
the Lombardy and Veneto regions. But in the South, Salvini had the opportunity to create a 
4 
 
movement that was fully dependent on his leadership and reflective of his populist views. 
This was also possible because in the southern regions the League had never had a governing 
role.  
These transformations were also linked to the changing coalition strategies of the League. 
Since 2000 the party had been a faithful ally of Berlusconi’s party, the Popolo della Libertà 
(People of Freedom, PdL), which then was renamed Forza Italia (Forward Italy, FI). The 
cohesion of the alliance partly depended on the strong personal relationship existing between 
Bossi and Berlusconi. Yet it could also be explained by purely political factors. Indeed, the two 
parties came to see each other as complementary, with Berlusconi’s party appealing to the 
moderate voters of the North but also playing a key role in southern region, while the 
Northern League attracted the support of key sectors of the northern Italian electorate, 
particular those which were more anti-establishment, radical and more opposed to Roman 
centralism. Even if Forza Italia alternated moderate appeals to populist discourse, its 
populism was very different from that of the Northern League, as Bobba and McDonnell 
[2016] clearly show in their study.  
However, Salvini’s new ‘national’ strategy seems less compatible with the idea of a (macro-) 
regionalist party allied with a statewide conservative party. This is also due to the dramatic 
weakening of Berlusconi’s party, which no longer seems to be able to act as the main pillar of 
the coalition and a ‘federator’ of political actors with substantially different positions and 
long-term goals. In addition, it has become increasingly difficult for the League to reconcile a 
stable alliance with FI, a member of the European People’s Party, since Salvini’s League has 
adopted a political platform that is mainly focused on anti-EU issues and foresees the creation 
of a cross-national populist network. Therefore, the relationship with FI has become more 
conflictual, even though there has not been a definitive breakup of the coalition and Salvini 
has left open the possibility of future alliances.  
The 2016 local elections: assessing the effects of Salvini’s reforms 
The 2016 local elections present an opportunity to assess the effects of the ideological, 
organisational and strategic changes introduced by Salvini, more than two years after his 
election as party leader. Table 1 focuses on municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants 
(and more than 10,000 in Sicilyv) and shows the geographical distribution of the party lists 
(Northern League and Noi con Salvini) and its coalition strategies in 2016. It can be seen that 
the party was present in 98% of the municipalities in Northern Italy, 76% in central Italy and 
only 21% in the South. In the latter two macro-areas the geographical expansion of the party 
has been significant, since in the previous elections the League presented its lists only in 28% 
and 4% of central and southern municipalities. Overall, Northern League candidates were 
competing in 59% of the main municipalities. This is an improvement when compared to the 
44% of the previous elections, although it is clear that the party is still far from becoming a 
truly national party. The League is still less ‘nationalised’ [Caramani 2004] than FI (officially 
running in 64% of municipalities) and well behind its main competitors, M5S (80%) and PD 
(98%).  
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It is also interesting to see that despite Salvini’s intention to run a more autonomous 
campaign, the Northern League formed coalitions with FI in 60% of the municipalities where 
it presented a list. In the remaining municipalities the League established alliances with local 
lists or with other right-wing parties (in some rare circumstances with centre parties). The 
aggregate figures did not change compared to the previous elections (when FI was still called 
PdL). Interestingly, however, there are some territorial divergences. In Northern Italy, the 
League remained an important governmental political force and it was more inclined to form 
coalitions with more moderate centre-right parties. In fact, the percentage of municipalities in 
which the League established an alliance with FI even increased from 56% to 65%. This 
percentage is significantly lower in central and southern Italy, where the Northern League 
had not traditionally played a key role in regional and local governments and, as a 
consequence, was less constrained by coalition obligations (and freer to adopt a more ‘anti-
establishment’ platform). Overall, it can be concluded that there is no strong evidence of a 
dramatic (and territorially homogeneous) change in the relationship between LN and FI at the 
local level, which places Salvini’s more radical rhetoric in a slightly different light. 
 
Table 1. Territorial distribution of lists and alliances of the Northern League (and Noi Con 
Salvini) in 2016 and comparison with the previous election. Absolute frequencies in brackets.  
 2016 Previous 
 List 
presented* 
Running 
with FI** 
Running 
alone or 
with other 
lists** 
List 
presented* 
Running 
with Fi 
(formerly 
PdL)** 
Running 
alone or 
with other 
lists** 
North 98% (55) 65% (36) 35% (19) 98% (55) 56% (31) 44% (24) 
Centre 76% (19) 53% (10) 47% (9) 28% (7) 86% (6) 14% (1) 
South 21% (14) 50% (7) 50% (7) 4% (3) 67% (2) 33% (1) 
Total 59% (88) 60% (53) 40% (35) 44% (65) 60% (39) 40% (26) 
*percentage of municipalities in which League presented its list (absolute frequency in brackets) 
**percentage calculated by considering only the municipalities in which the League presented its list  
Source: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/. Focus on municipalities above 15,000 inhabitants (above 10,000 
inhabitants in Sicily).  
 
If we focus on the four largest cities that were involved in this electoral round – Rome, Milan, 
Turin and Naples – it appears equally evident that the Northern League did not have a 
consistent coalition strategy. Whereas in Naples the party failed to present its list, in Rome 
Salvini opposed the candidacy of Guido Bertolaso proposed by FI. Instead, he encouraged the 
creation of a ‘Lepenist front’ led by Giorgia Meloni, the leader of the right-wing Fratelli d’Italia 
(Brothers of Italy, FdI)vi. Eventually FI dropped Bertolaso’s candidacy but did not join its 
former allies and decided to support another moderate candidate, leader of a local list, Alfio 
Marchini. The same happened in Turin, where the League and FdI decided to run an 
autonomous campaign and refused to support the official FI candidate, Osvaldo Napoli, a 
former Christian-democrat, considered too moderate and close to the political 
establishmentvii.  
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However, in Milan the situation was completely different, with Salvini accepting the need to 
form a broad coalition including moderate parties that were in the Renzi government at the 
national levelviii. The role played by Roberto Maroni, former leader of the League and current 
President of Lombardy, in promoting the establishment of a ‘classic’ centre-right coalition was 
crucial in this case. The Milanese candidate of the centre-right coalition, Stefano Parisi, 
explicitly opposed populist and extremist positions and framed his electoral campaign by 
referring to traditional liberal-conservative themes. This led to increasing tensions with 
Salvini, who ended up leading a de facto separate electoral campaign focused on supporting 
his party list rather than the candidate for mayorix.  
Electoral results may provide stronger evidence of the new political nature of the Northern 
League. Table 2 shows the geographical distributionx of results of this party in 2016 and in the 
previous local elections. It can be seen that in terms of votes there has been a slight 
redistribution of support from North to South. Overall the Northern league gained almost 
40,000 votes, but lost around 12,000 votes in northern Italy and gained more than 55,000 in 
central and southern Italy. In terms of percentages, however, it is clear that the North is where 
the party continues to receive most of its support. In central Italy, the party received 3% of the 
vote from a starting point of almost non-existence in the previous elections. In southern Italy, 
the party remained marginal with a 0.2% of the vote. Nationally the party only increased its 
share of the vote by 1 percentage point and remained well behind the PD (18.6%) and the M5S 
(17.1%). The League did not manage to overtake FI, which, despite experiencing a collapse in 
its electoral support, obtained 7.1% of the vote against the 5.3% of Salvini’s party. Surprisingly, 
Forza Italia almost doubled the result of the Northern League in Milan. In general, neither the 
radical area nor the moderate one of the centre-right bloc seemed to clearly prevail in the big 
cities. In Milan and Naples, Berlusconi’s moderate candidates were competitive enough to 
reach the second round of the electoral competition, whereas in Rome and Turin they obtained 
fewer votes than those of the ‘Lepenist’ coalition (which included FdI and the League).  
The results of the elections also suggest a strengthening of local lists, which are not explicitly 
partisan, even though they may still be linked to a particular political movement or coalition. 
Generally, in a context of increasing de-politicisation of the local dimension, political parties 
may find it convenient to “outsource” representation to lists that are not formally recognisable 
as ‘partisan’ [Vampa 2016a: 583]. This phenomenon seems particularly significant on the 
centre-right of the political spectrum. Indeed, across the 24 main cities (capoluoghi) that 
participated in the 2016 local elections, the three core parties of the coalition (League, FI and 
FdI) only obtained 18.8% of the vote (they had won 26.2% in the previous election), whereas 
electoral support for centre-right local(or civic) lists increased from 5 to 10.4% [Vampa 2016b, 
305–306]. 
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Table 2. Electoral results of the Northern League. Comparison with previous local elections in 
brackets.  
 Votes % Seats Municipalities 
won (in 
coalition with 
FI) 
Municipalities 
won (without 
FI) 
North 217933 
(-12435) 
11.3 
(+0.6) 
199 
(+36) 
16 
(+8) 
9 
(+4) 
Centre 52710 
(+48179) 
3 
(+2.7) 
28 
(+26) 
1 
(=) 
4 
(+4) 
South 4054 
(+3623) 
0.2 
(+0.2) 
1 
(+1) 
1 
(=) 
0 
(=) 
Total 274697 
(+39367) 
5.3 
(+1) 
228 
(+73) 
18 
(+8) 
13 
(+8) 
Source: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/ 
Table 2 also suggests that in the last round of local elections the Northern League managed to 
increase its institutional representation (gaining 73 local councillors). This only partly 
occurred as a consequence of the proportional increase in vote share, which was quite modest. 
Instead it was mainly due to the majority bonuses granted by the municipal electoral system 
to winning coalitions. Since the number of municipalities won by coalitions including the 
Northern League had increased (Table 2, last two columns), a consequence of the majoritarian 
voting system was that the number of seats obtained by the party increased 
disproportionately. It is interesting to note that in northern Italy, the League mainly won in 
‘broad’ coalitions that also included FI. However, it should also be underlined that in this 
macro-region, the League lost one of its historic strongholds, Varese, after more than 20 years 
of unchallenged dominance. In central Italy, on the other hand, the party was able to win the 
mayoral election without formal alliances with FI in 4 out of 5 cases. Finally, the League was 
part of a winning coalition, including FI, only in one southern municipality, again confirming 
its marginal role in this part of Italy. 
 
 
 
The Northern league until October 2016: losing political momentum? 
Under Salvini’s leadership, the League appears to have recovered from a crisis that started in 
2012 when a series of scandals involving key party figures forced its founder Umberto Bossi 
to resign as leader after more than 20 years in control. However, the 2016 local elections 
suggest a slow-down in the electoral expansion of the party. In late-2014 and 2015 the party 
was increasingly seen by commentators as the only one that could challenge Renzi. At the 
same time, Salvini seemed ready to unseat Berlusconi as the leader of the centre-right 
coalition, with the League replacing a declining Forza Italia as the main pillar of that political 
area. Even Berlusconi started considering the possibility of ‘abdicating’ in favour of the 
League’s rising star. During a press conference, the leader of FI, who often relies on football 
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metaphors, defined Salvini as a ‘goleador’ (goal scorer) and declared to be ready to step aside 
and play the role of ‘regista’ (deep-lying playmaker)xi.  This meant that Salvini could aspire to 
become the top representative of the centre-right coalition in the competition with PD and 
M5S, while Berlusconi, in his role of ‘founding father’ (padre nobile) of the alliance, would 
mainly act as his strategic adviser. During this time the M5S no longer seemed to be the only 
effective opposition (and alternative) to the government. In fact, the rise of the League 
corresponded with a phase of stagnation (even crisis) for the Movement founded by Beppe 
Grillo. Polls indicated an increasing popularity of Salvini after the 2014 European Parliament 
elections, which was also evident in the outcome of regional elections in November 2014 and 
May 2015, when the party seemed to gain political momentum.  
There are various ways to assess whether 2016 has seen a slowdown (or even reversal) of the 
electoral fortunes of the Northern League. The first one is to look at the percentage of votes 
obtained by the party in those municipalities that have participated in all electoral 
competitions (local, regional, national and European) from 2013 to 2016. 69 municipalities 
with more than 15,000 inhabitants can be included in this analysisxii. Figure 1 clearly shows a 
slight recovery in 2014 (European election) from the low point reached in 2013 (general 
election) and a dramatic growth in 2015 (regional election). However, in the 2016 local 
elections, the overall share of votes in the 69 municipalities has declined by almost three 
percentage points from 7% to 4.4%.  
 
Figure 1. Electoral results of the Northern League from 2013 to 2016 in 69 municipalities with 
more than 15,000 inhabitants 
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Electoral polls and surveys also suggest that the Northern League might have reached the 
limit of its growth in 2015. The polls conducted by Ilvo Diamanti’s Demos clearly show that 
in late 2014 and 2015 the League experienced a phase of significant electoral expansion (Figure 
2), confirmed by the results of the regional elections mentioned above. This was accompanied 
by a sharp decline in the support for Forza Italia. The rise of the League also occurred in a 
period of crisis and transition for the 5 Start Movement, after the disappointing result of the 
European election. Salvini’s party seemed to be able to attract some of the protest votes 
(particularly the ‘right-wing’ ones), which were abandoning, at least temporarily, Grillo’s 
party.  
However, Figure 2 also shows that in the second half of 2015 and in 2016, the League was 
unable to further increase its electoral support. Overall, it seems that there are some 
‘structural’ constraints that have prevented the League from going beyond a 15% ceiling in 
the national vote share. These constraints are partly territorial – i.e. the inability of the party 
to gain substantial support in southern regions – and partly derive from the fact that the 
‘populist’ political offer is now particularly crowded and dominated by a recovering M5S. The 
October 2016 poll by Demos suggested that support for the League went below 10% for the 
first time since October 2014, thus confirming the difficulties experienced by the party. 
 
Figure 2. Voting intentions from October 2013 to October 2016 
 
Source: Demos, Atlante Politico http://www.demos.it/  
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In 2015, polls also suggested that Salvini became the most popular politician after Matteo 
Renzi and, for the first time, seemed a serious contender to the premiership. Therefore, his 
aspirations to become the leader of the whole centre-right coalition seemed justified. 
However, also in this case, 2016 polls show that the picture has changed. Salvini’s popularity 
ceased to grow (and actually slightly declined). Luigi di Maio, who has emerged as the de facto 
leader of the M5S, overtook support for Salvini in opinion polls and has positioned himself as 
Renzi’s main competitor (Figure 3). If in 2015 it seemed that the centre-right had found a new 
leader in 2016 the picture appeared less clear. The centre-right remains very fragmented and 
Salvini is far from being unanimously considered as a possible unifying leader. In fact, he has 
to face increasing hostility from the more moderate faction of Forza Italia, which has turned 
to Stefano Parisi – who proved to be a competitive centre-right candidate in Milan – as a 
possible leader of the coalition (see next section). Berlusconi’s limited support for the leader 
of the Northern League seemed to decrease further, partly as a consequence of the coalitional 
divisions that emerged in Rome and Turin.  
 
Figure 3. Leaders’ popularity (from October 2013 to October 2016): Renzi, Maroni*/Salvini, 
Berlusconi, Grillo**/Di Maio.  
 
Source: Demos, Atlante Politico http://www.demos.it/ *until December 2013 **until June 2015 
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Like Matteo Renzi, Matteo Salvini sought to strengthen his leadership by sustaining political 
momentum and demonstrating his direct appeal to the electorate, contrasting with the 
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turned to Salvini, a relatively young politician, who had never played a key role in national 
politics, as the only one who could regain the trust of voters in a context of rising anti-
establishment feelings and thus save the party from political extinction. However, unlike 
Renzi, Salvini could not rely on the control of key governing roles to counterbalance a decline 
(or stagnation) in his popularity. As the former Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti used to say, 
“power wears out those who don’t have it” (“il potere logora chi non ce l’ha”) and long-term 
opposition may in fact lead to slow political decline. The 5 Star Movement seemed to be the 
first victim of this phenomenon between 2014 and 2015 but then managed to reverse its 
political fate by gradually replacing Grillo’s leadership with a more collegial body (the 
direttorio) xiii and exploiting the crisis experienced by the Democratic Party in the city of Rome. 
This led to victories in the 2016 local elections, which, as shown in Figure 2, marked a second 
wave of electoral expansion for the Movement.  
With the disappointing results of the local elections, in which the Northern League even failed 
to obtain more votes than the declining Forza Italia, tensions re-emerged within the partyxiv. A 
few weeks after the election, Roberto Maroni, interviewed by the newspaper la Repubblicaxv, 
expressed his doubts about the ‘Lepenist turn’ made by Salvini, saying that this strategy 
would confuse voters and undermine electoral support for the League in its traditional 
strongholds in Northern Italy (defeats in Milan and his home town Varese were particularly 
bruising for the President of Lombardy). He also showed some interest in the more moderate 
(and inclusivexvi) project proposed by Stefano Parisi, who, after his defeat in Milan, decided 
to launch a national campaign for a new centre-right coalition. Parisi’s programme was more 
inspired by conservative and Christian-democratic traditions, in line with the ideas of the 
European People’s Party, and was clearly seen as incompatible with the populist and 
xenophobic project supported by Salvinixvii. The hostility and distrust were reciprocal and 
Salvini declared that, unlike Maroni, he was not interested in Parisi’s platform, which he saw 
as too moderate (and Euro-positive) and doomed to electoral defeatxviii.   
The new phase also marked the return of the old leader, Umberto Bossi, who started attacking 
Salvini and questioning the effectiveness of his leadership. In an interview for the weekly 
L’Espresso, Bossi explicitly stated that Salvini was going in the completely wrong directionxix. 
In the same piece, the journalist Roberto Di Caro reported some interviews with old party 
activists. While they recognised that Salvini’s leadership had saved the party from a decline 
which, after 2013, seemed irreversible, they also demanded more emphasis on issues of 
autonomy and regionalism. According to the more ‘traditionalist’ factions of the party, the 
governments of Lombardy and Veneto, led by Maroni and Zaia, should be seen as the models 
to follow and should not be replaced by Marine Le Pen’s populist model, which would risk 
relegating the party to the role of vocal, but ineffective, opposition.  
In some cases, the autonomist, and even pro-independence, agenda was pushed by the 
regional branches of the party in traditional strongholds. For instance, in Veneto the council 
majority supporting Zaia passed a law that grants the status of ‘national minority’ to the 
people of Veneto and tried to impose the teaching of the Venetian language in schools. This 
law was defined by the media as the first step towards ‘Venexit’xx, since a referendum will 
also be called to increase the autonomy of the Veneto region. Salvini will probably face the 
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challenge of reconciling these re-emerging centrifugal pressures with his idea of creating an 
Italian Front National, which, as the French case illustrates, is not particularly supportive of 
decentralization and regional autonomy [Ivaldi and Lanzone 2016].  
In 2016 Salvini was also seen as totally unable to compromise with other political actors, even 
those ideologically close to the League, and increase the influence of the party through the 
establishment of strategic alliances. Even his ‘Lepenist’ project did not seem to succeed and 
give life to a broad coalition of right-wing movements. The contacts with Fratelli d’Italia, for 
instance, did not intensify after the local elections, perhaps because the decision to form right-
wing coalitions in Rome and Turin did not prove as electorally successful as expected. More 
generally, Salvini struggled to act as a federator of the radical rightxxi and did not manage to 
unify the whole centre-right, which remained highly fragmented and unable to develop a 
shared political platform. Yet it is too early to say that Salvini’s project completely failed and, 
in fact, two political events occurred at the end of 2016 may create new opportunities for the 
League. 
 
New opportunities?  
As highlighted in this chapter, most of 2016 was a period of stasis for the Northern League, 
which seemed unable to expand its electoral support beyond its peak of 2015. As a 
consequence, it struggled to play a dominant role in the centre-right political camp and in 
opposing the Renzi government. However, changing national and international 
circumstances could be exploited by Salvini to regain political momentum and relaunch his 
populist discourse.  
The first important development was the election of Donald Trump as the new President of 
the United States in November 2016. The unexpected victory of a presidential candidate who 
was accused of racism, sexism, isolationism and right-wing populism will probably have 
important global consequences. European democracies are particularly exposed to the effects 
of radical political shifts occurring in their most powerful and closest international ally. For 
instance, since 2008, Barack Obama’s progressive message has inspired European social 
democrats and liberals in search of a new political identity. Now Trump may be regarded as 
an equally powerful model for the more radical sectors of the European right, thus reinforcing 
a populist discourse that has already been on the rise in recent years.   
During the presidential campaign, Salvini was the only Italian leader, who openly endorsed 
the American billionaire. Therefore, it is not surprising that after the US elections, Salvini 
portrayed himself as the ‘Italian Trump’xxii and fully embraced the American experience. The 
heavily web-based and unconventional campaign launched by the Republican nominee 
demonstrated that it was possible to achieve political success even without the support of the 
establishment and traditional media. Therefore, Trump’s victory helped Salvini relaunch his 
leadership and reinvigorate his vision of a new anti-system, nationalist right.  
The American events also played a role in the League’s campaign against the constitutional 
reform approved by the majority supporting Renzi. The referendum held on 4th December 
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was seen as another opportunity to reshape the political discourse, particularly on the centre-
right of the political spectrum. It is not a coincidence that immediately after Trump’s victory, 
Salvini organised a big political rally in Florence to open his referendum campaignxxiii. The 
choice of the location was not casual, since Renzi started his political career as the President 
of the Province of Florence and late became Mayor of the city. This clearly indicated that the 
main target of the League was not the constitutional reform per se but the Renzi government 
and some of its policies that were unrelated to the constitutional reform, in particular 
immigration (in the context of the refugee crisis) and EU policies. The Florentine rally was 
also an opportunity to strengthen the links with other parties on the right, particularly with 
FdI and its leader, Giorgia Meloni, who participated in the event. The faction of Forza Italia 
that was hostile to the moderate project proposed by Stefano Parisi also decided to join 
Salvini’s campaignxxiv. This once again shows that the situation on the centre-right of the 
political spectrum is in continuous flux.  
Overall, the referendum campaign, which was mainly based on political opposition to the 
government rather on than the actual content of the reform, helped the League overcome a 
situation of political gridlock. The party seemed to benefit from the combined effect of 
Trump’s victory and a successful referendum campaign. The November poll by Demosxxv 
showed that the League gained 4 percentage points in one month (from 9.7% to 13.7%).  Salvini 
increased his personal popularity from 32 to 38%, thus regaining his position as the most 
popular leader after Renzi. A post-referendum poll also showed that both League and M5S 
voters were the most mobilised against the reform (88% for both partiesxxvi). The results of the 
referendum, which saw the clear defeat of Renzi and his majority, led to the resignation of the 
Prime Minister and the formation of a new government led by Paolo Gentiloni, a close ally of 
Matteo Renzi in the Democratic Party. By intensifying his opposition to a weak government, 
born on the ashes of a bruising defeat, Salvini may be able to open a new phase of political 
success for his party before the next general election.  
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